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Abstract
Introduction Much of the discussion of set-theoretic independence, and whether or not
we could legitimately expand our foundational theory, concerns how we could possibly
come to know the truth value of independent sentences. This paper pursues a slightly
different tack, examining how we are ignorant of issues surrounding their truth. We
argue that a study of how we are ignorant reveals a need for an understanding of set-
theoretic explanation and motivates a pluralism concerning the adoption of foundational
theory.
Materials and Methods Our strategy is as follows. First (‘‘Varieties of Independence’’),
we note two different kinds of independence, those that are sensitive to large cardinal
axioms, and those that are not. We pick two well-studied examples from the literature:
{Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis} (henceforth CH and {Projective Determinacy}
(henceforth ‘PD’). We then (‘‘Multiversism and Pluralism’’) present two views con-
cerning set-theoretic ontology (namely Multiversism and Universism), and explain how
each might be linked to the acceptance or rejection of a Pluralism in set-theoretic
foundations. Next (‘‘Varieties of Ignorance’’), we change tack and exposit some litera-
ture on the study of ignorance (often called agnotology). We then (‘‘What is our
Ignorance of Independent Sentences Like?’’), examine how various positions might
regard our ignorance of CH and PD. Finally (‘‘How Ignorance Affects Pluralism’’), we
argue that certain views of our ignorance of independent sentences motivate pluralism
concerning the study of set-theoretic foundations, even on a Universist picture.
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Conclusion We conclude that despite the prima facie tension between Universism and
Pluralism, the character of our ignorance suggests a fusion of the two positions.
Keywords Philosophy of mathematics  Philosophy of set theory  Multiversism 
Foundations of mathematics  Agnotology
Introduction
It is well known that many statements of set theory cannot be either proved or
disproved on the basis of the ZFC axioms. Some have seen this as indicative of a
failure of our concept of set to determine a single Universe of sets rather than a
Multiverse of different universes (we shall see some discussion of these views
later).
Much of the discussion surrounding independence focusses on whether or not we
could come to know set-theoretic sentences independent of ZFC, and if so, how.1 In
this paper, we examine a slightly different question: what is our ignorance of
independent sentences like? Assuming that we do not know the answers to questions
independent from ZFC, how should we understand this ignorance? How, if at all,
might this influence any pluralism concerning set-theoretic foundation?
Our strategy is as follows. First (‘‘Varieties of Independence’’) we note two
different kinds of independence, those that are sensitive to large cardinal axioms,
and those that are not. We pick two well-studied examples from the literature:
Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis (henceforth ‘CH’) and Projective Determinacy
(henceforth ‘PD’). We then (‘‘Multiversism and Universes’’) present two views
concerning set-theoretic ontology, and explain how each might be linked to the
acceptance or rejection of a Pluralism in set-theoretic foundations. Next (‘‘Varieties
of Ignorance’’), we change tack and exposit some literature on the study of
ignorance (often called agnotology). We then (‘‘What is Our Ignorance of
Independent Sentences Like?’’) examine how various positions might regard our
ignorance of CH and PD. Finally (‘‘How Ignorance Affects Pluralism’’), we argue
that certain views of our ignorance of independent sentences motivates pluralism
concerning the study of set-theoretic foundations, even on a Universist picture. We
conclude that despite the prima facie tension between Universism and Pluralism, the
character of our ignorance suggests a fusion of the two positions.
Varieties of Independence
Before we go further we should be precise about two different kinds of
independence we might see. A natural question, once one is aware of Cantor’s
Theorem that there is no bijection between a set and its powerset, is whether or not
there is an intermediate cardinality between that of the natural numbers and its
powerset. The hypothesis that there is no such cardinal number is known as Cantor’s
1 See, for example, the work of Maddy in Maddy (1988a, b, 2011), and Koellner in Koellner (2010). For
a pessimistic yet elegant position, see Hamkins (2012) and Hamkins (2015).
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Continuum Hypothesis (or ‘CH’) and can be coded as a statement of third-order
arithmetic.
However, independence from ZFC comes before the level of third-order
arithmetic, yielding a different kind of independence. Determinacy axioms concern
strategies (represented as functions) for generating reals, and can be played over
certain subsets of the reals (where one player wins if the real generated is in the
relevant subset, where the other wins if the real is not in the subset). For example,
Projective Determinacy is the statement that any projectively defined set of reals has
a winning strategy. PD can be coded as a (schematic) statement of second-order
arithmetic.2
There are a number of arguments both for and against CH and PD in
themselves.3 Important for our purposes, however, will be the relationship between
these principles and large cardinals.4 There is no formal definition of a large
cardinal axiom; however, there are a family of natural principles that index
consistency strength, seemingly in a linear fashion.5 Salient is the following
theorem:
Theorem 1 Martin and Steel (1989) If there are infinitely many Woodin cardinals6
then PD holds.
2 For details of Projective Determinacy, as well as other Determinacy Axioms, see Jech (2002) and
Koellner and Woodin (2010). For the reader interested in the technical details: The kind of game in
question involves two players (denoted by ‘I’ and ‘II’) in a state of perfect information (i.e. both I and II
have infallible knowledge about past moves of the game). The game is played over some subset S of xx:
the set of all infinite sequences of natural numbers. For the purposes of determinacy, xx is used to
represent the set of all real numbers; since it is homeomorphic to the irrationals, one can simply prove
results about xx and then transfer the theorems across using the homeomorphism. I and II takes turns to
play natural numbers against one another. After x-many turns in this game, the players will have
generated a real number (let it be denoted by ‘r’). I is said to win if r 2 S, and player II wins if r 62 S. We
can see that the possible moves allowed in a game are represented by a tree T, given by the legitimate
moves players may make at each successive point of the game, with a length ascribed to each position of a
play of the game p (denoted by ‘length(p)’). A strategy for player A is a function r with domain
fp 2 T j½lengthðpÞ is even and p is not a terminal element of Tg; such that rðpÞ is always a legal
move for A in T . Similarly we can define the notion of a strategy for B as a function s with
domain fp 2 T j½lengthðpÞis odd and p is not a terminal element ofTg such that sðpÞ is always a legal
move for A in T. A winning strategy for player X is a strategy p for X such that X wins every game
consistent with p. A set of reals is said to be determined iff one of the two players has a winning strategy.
The projective sets are sets of reals obtained from the operations of complementation and projection from
closed subsets of ðxxÞn for n 2 x. Thus, PD states that whenever the subset S over which the game is
being played is projective, then one of the two players has a winning strategy.
3 An excellent review of some of the options is discussed in Maddy (1988a, b).
4 Of course, large cardinal axioms themselves constitute a significant and interesting area of
independence from ZFC. While we provide some remarks later concerning large cardinals and
mathematical explanation, we are largely interested here in independence low in the cumulative
hierarchy.
5 While all evidence points in this direction, nonetheless, due to the informal nature of the notion of large
cardinal axiom, no a priori proof of this claim is possible.
6 A cardinal j is Woodin iff for all A  Vj, there are arbitrarily large a\j such that for all b\j there
exists an elementary embedding j : V !M with critical point a, such that jðaÞ[b; Vb  M, and
A \ Vb ¼ A \ jðVbÞ.
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Thus we see that PD is sensitive to the existence of large cardinals.7 By contrast,
we have the following theorem concerning CH:
Theorem 2 Le´vy and Solovay (1967) Let M be a model of set theory and j be
measurable.8 Then there are forcing extensions of M in which CH is true and
others in which CH is false but j remains measurable.
The above theorem shows that known large cardinal hypotheses cannot be used
to settle the truth value of CH in the manner of PD. This is because, no matter how
many large cardinals we have, we are able to use a relatively mild small forcing to
modify the truth value of CH, while leaving the large cardinal properties intact. As
we shall see, this difference will prove to be relevant. Many scholars feel that this
difference between PD and CH means that we are in a very different epistemic
position with respect to each.9
Multiversism and Pluralism
Independence has motivated several theories concerning how we should understand
the subject matter of set theory. Central to our discussion will be the following two
positions:
Multiversism is the view that there are many universes of set theory, no one of
which is ontologically privileged. Any universe of sets can be extended to a
larger universe.
Universism is the view that there is a single, unique, maximal universe of set-
theoretic discourse.
often Multiversism is seen as linked to the following position.
Pluralism is the view that we should investigate many different set theories,
and no one is foundationally privileged in the sense that we conduct
foundational inquiry in different theories at different times.
Multiversism and Pluralism appear to be naturally linked. If we are Multiversists
and believe that there are a variety of universes, each of which satisfies some theory
or other and is on an ontologically equal footing, then we are likely to hold that the
theory of sets we adopt is underdetermined. We can operate within any particular
legitimate universe, using the theory that one finds there as our foundation. For
example, Hamkins writes:
The multiverse view does not abandon the goal of using set theory as an
epistemological and ontological foundation for mathematics, for we expect to
7 In fact this sensitivity is shared by several other statements of second-order arithmetic at the level of
Vxþ1 (for example ADLðRÞ), in contrast to third-order arithmetic (which inhabits Vxþ2). See Koellner and
Woodin (2010) for details.
8 A cardinal j is measurable iff it is the critical point of a non-trivial elementary embedding j : V !M.
It is the weakest kind of cardinal defined by an elementary embedding from V to an inner model thereof.
9 See, for example, Maddy (2011) and Koellner (2006).
J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res.
123
find all our familiar mathematical objects, such as the integer ring, the real
field and our favourite topological spaces, inside any one of the universes of
the multiverse. On the multiverse view, set theory remains a foundation for the
classical mathematical enterprise. The difference is that when a mathematical
issue is revealed to have a set-theoretic dependence, as in the independence
results, then the multiverse response is a careful explanation that the
mathematical fact of the matter depends on which concept of set is used, and
this is almost always a very interesting situation, in which one may weigh the
desirability of various set-theoretic hypotheses with their mathematical
consequences. (Hamkins 2012, p. 419)
Thus, Hamkins has a position where we can operate in any one of a number of
different universes of sets. Despite the fact that many of these universes satisfy
different theories, we can nonetheless use them as foundational as all the relevant
objects studied by the ‘ordinary’ mathematician appear there.
While someone who believes in the existence of a single, unique, maximal
universe of sets might well be interested in a diversity of different theories, they
nonetheless hold that there is a fact of the matter concerning which one is true.
Thus, they might think that they should be interested in cutting down the theories
available (eventually focussing on one such) in order to get closer to a better
account of the truth value of independent sentences. As we shall see, a study of how
we are ignorant of sentences independent from ZFC reveals that this methodology
is misguided. In order to understand the Universe of sets better, and strengthen the
case for one’s own favourite theory of sets, it is fruitful pursue a wide variety of
other foundational theories.
Varieties of Ignorance
Let us take stock. We have seen that several authors regard our epistemic limitations
concerning sets as indicative of the existence of a multiverse of sets rather than a
single universe thereof. This link merits examination. Most philosophers have
focussed on what it would take to come to know (or, more minimally, be justified in
asserting that) CH. For example, Maddy writes:
The question of how the unproven can be justified is especially pressing in
current set theory, where the search is on for new axioms to determine the size
of the continuum. This pressing problem is also the deepest that contemporary
mathematics presents to the contemporary philosopher of mathematics. Not
only would progress towards understanding the process of mathematical
hypothesis formation and confirmation contribute to our philosophical
understanding of the nature of mathematics, it might even be of help and
solace to those mathematicians actively engaged in the axiom search. (Maddy
1988a, p. 482)
arguing that we should analyse the process of confirmation and justification. Her
ideas are developed further in Maddy (1990, 1997, 2007, 2011), and similar ideas
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have also been taken up by Koellner and Woodin in Koellner (2006) and Koellner
and Woodin (2010). In the opposite direction, Hamkins argues that any attempt to
come to know or justify CH is doomed to fail:
I claim that our extensive experience in the set-theoretic worlds in which CH
is true and others in which CH is false prevents us from looking upon any
statement settling CH as being a natural set-theoretic truth. We simply have
had too much experience by now with the contrary situation. (Hamkins
2015, p. 135)
Hamkins’ point is thus that the use of various model-theoretic constructions in
proving independence results facilitates an ability to understand what it is like to
reason in those worlds. This then prevents any widespread acceptance of CH; as
soon as an axiom is shown to imply CH or its negation, its naturalness is
immediately vitiated by excluding prima facie natural set-theoretic universes.
While most philosophers have focussed on the back and forth of this debate, and
what it would take to come to know or justify independent sentences, a positive
account of our ignorance appears lacking. The issue is especially relevant given the
advances in the philosophical study of ignorance that have been made over the last
30 years. Before we embark on a more detailed analysis of the agnotological status
of independent sentences, we first provide a brief exposition of the relevant
literature necessary for our arguments.10
The first kind of ignorance we shall consider is that of conscious ignorance. Such
ignorance concerns questions11 to which we do not know the answers, but we
nonetheless know that we do not know. Such questions are typically the targets of
our investigations (both scientific and otherwise). Good examples (from my own
extensive ignorance database) include:
(1:) I do not know how many miles my dad’s car has on the clock.
(2:) I do not know what parts of category theory were used in the first proofs of
Fermat’s Last Theorem.
(3:) As of the year 2010, I did not know whether or not there were Higgs bosons.
(4:) I do not know whether or not there are infinitely many twin primes.
Each case has a number of differences. (1.) I do not know, simply because I do
not find the question especially interesting. Despite this, I could easily verify it (say
by checking his odometer next time I get a lift). (2.) I do not know, however,
presumably with enough time and effort I could learn the required mathematics, and
there definitely are people who do know. (3.) and (4.) are both no fault of mine, but I
do know what would constitute/would have constituted a solution in a particular
direction in each case (namely an observation of the relevant particle at CERN for
the Higgs boson, and a peer-reviewed proof for the Twin Prime Conjecture).
10 An excellent introduction and survey is available in Wilholt.
11 Ignorance is often formulated as directed towards research questions rather than propositions in order
to avoid thorny issues surrounding Meno’s paradox. See Wilholt (2017) for discussion.
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Despite these vagaries in kinds of ignorance, however, I do know (1) that I do not
know the answer to a particular question, and (2) roughly what it would take to have
an answer. Thus my ignorance is conscious: I know about it, and can investigate
accordingly.12 More precisely, we can follow Bromberger (1992) in providing
necessary conditions on ignorance of an agent A with respect to some research
question Q:
(A) A is able to articulate Q in a language in which she is competent and is aware
of Q.
(B) A does not know the answer to Q.
(C) Q admits of a single correct answer.
(D) A believes that she does not know the correct answer to Q.
(E) A believes that Q has a correct answer.
Conscious ignorance can come in different flavours, however. Consider, for
example, the following question:
(5:) What happens when an object goes into a black hole?
I am consciously ignorant of this question. My lack of ignorance is especially
interesting, however, in that it plausibly displays the following two features13:
A is in a p-predicament with regard to Q if and only if, in A’s views, Q admits
of a right answer, but A can think of no answer to which, in A’s views, there
are no decisive objections.
and
A is in a b-predicament with regard to Q if and only if the question is sound,
but the correct answer is beyond what the person can conceive or articulate.
Why am I in a b-predicament and a p-predicament with respect to (5.)? Well, for
those explanations I understand concerning what happens when we observe
something enter a black hole, I can think of good reasons to reject each. Every
explanation of which I am aware, I find deeply problematic on the basis of some
gedanken experiment or other. Thus I am in a p-predicament. However, I am also
likely to be in a b-predicament; whatever the correct explanation is, it is likely that,
with my limited knowledge of esoteric theoretical physics, I am currently unable to
compose or understand the answer, even if someone directly tells me.
p-predicaments and b-predicaments are independent phenomena; any combination
of them is possible. For example, though I might be in a b-predicament and p-
12 The examples of (3.) and (4.) are somewhat subtle in that for practical reasons I have to rely on the
expertise of others to provide verification. However, should I be inclined to, I could (in some appropriate
modal sense) try and investigate the issue, and know what would constitute a solution in each case. For
example, I could give up philosophy tomorrow and begin to attempt to prove the Twin Prime Conjecture.
13 See Bromberger (1992), Chap. 2 for a fuller description of these kinds of phenomena, as well as
Wilholt (2017).
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predicament with respect to the question of black holes, I am not in either position
with respect to the number of miles on the odometer of my dad’s car. I can think of
many plausible values, for which I do not have a robust reason to think false.
Moreover, I will be able to articulate what the value will be: some relatively small
natural number. Returning again to the question of black holes, though I am probably
in both a b-predicament and a p-predicament, things could quite easily have been
otherwise. Suppose I think that the view that the surface of a black hole acts as a
hologram of its contents is at least plausible,14 and am not aware of the various
gedanken experiments that challenge such a view. Thus, I am not in a p-predicament:
I can think of no decisive objections against the view that the surface of a black hole
behaves like a hologram of its contents. However, I may very well still be in a b-
predicament (say if the actual answer turns out to be very complex). For the converse
direction, suppose that the holographic account of what happens when an object falls
into a black hole is actually correct. Then I would be in a p-predicament (I still regard
the holographic explanation as deeply problematic), but not a b-predicament, I can
(just about) cognise and formulate what happens when an object falls into a black
hole. When we are either in a p-predicament or b-predicament and consciously
ignorant, we will say that we are deeply consciously ignorant.15
In addition to conscious ignorance, we also have opaque ignorance. This
concerns questions to which we do not know the answer, and we also do not know
that we do not know the answer. In each of the cases we will violate one of
conditions (A), (C), (D), or (E). We might be ignorant of the answer to question
because we are unable to articulate the question properly (and hence would find
ourselves automatically in a b-predicament as well). It might be that we fail to
recognise that the question does not admit of a correct answer. Alternatively, we
might just be in a state of error, believing that we have an answer to the question
when actually our answer is incorrect. Finally, we might regard Q as lacking a
correct answer, when it actually possesses one.
It should be noted that opacity does not necessarily imply depth. For example,
suppose that my dad’s car has 30,000 miles on the clock. Suppose further that I
snuck a quick glance at the odometer yesterday, however I misread the ‘3’ as a ‘2’,
and hence I believe that his car has done only 20,000 miles. What should we say
about this case? I am opaquely ignorant: I believe (wrongly) that there are 20,000
miles on the clock, violating (D). However, I am in neither a p-predicament nor a b-
predicament: I think there is an answer to which there are no good objections
(namely 20,000 miles), and I can perfectly well articulate the correct answer.16
14 See Susskind (1994) for an exposition of this fun idea.
15 Wilholt (2017) reserves the use of the term ‘deep’ solely for cases when we find ourselves in a p-
predicament. As we shall see, b-predicaments will also be relevant here, so I will opt for a more liberal
usage.
16 Examples of this sort bear a resemblance to Gettier-style cases, but for the fact that the belief in
question is false. For example, if we modified the above example so that I still misread the ‘3’ as a ‘2’, but
in fact someone has wound the clock forward by 10,000 miles (so my dad’s car actually has done 20,000
miles), we would arrive at a standard Gettier case: my belief is true, I have justification, but I cannot
reasonably be said to know. As we shall see, forms of mathematical Gettier-style situations (and the
variety of ignorance they engender) will be relevant for our arguments.
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What is Our Ignorance of Independent Sentences Like?
The time has come to put the recent developments explained above to work in
coming to a better understanding of our ignorance of independent sentences. A
Multiversist attacks the problem by using their view of ontology to dispel much of
our ignorance. Our knowledge concerning sentences such as CH consists in how
they behave across the Multiverse. Such a sentiment receives expression in the work
of Multiversists:
On the multiverse view, consequently, the continuum hypothesis is a settled
question; it is incorrect to describe the CH as an open problem. The answer to
CH consists of the expansive, detailed knowledge set theorists have gained
about the extent to which it holds and fails in the multiverse, about how to
achieve it or its negation in combination with other diverse set-theoretic
properties. Of course, there are and will always remain questions about
whether one can achieve CH or its negation with this or that hypothesis, but
the point is that the most important and essential facts about CH are deeply
understood, and these facts constitute the answer to the CH question.
(Hamkins 2012, p. 429)
Thus, for a liberal multiversist of Hamkins’ persuasion, while there is some
ignorance regarding how CH behaves in certain models, largely speaking we have a
good deal of knowledge regarding CH.
The cases that we shall examine concern attitudes to CH and PD given the
Universist’s picture of set-theoretic ontology.17 The first task is to settle on the
research question with which we are interested. The most immediate questions
would be:
(6:) What is the value of the continuum?
(7:) Does every projective set of reals admit of a winning strategy?
However, we can never be in either a p-predicament or b-predicament with
respect to (6.) or (7). For (6.), we can articulate any value the continuum might take
(and so cannot be in a b-predicament), and also it is one of the main lessons of the
independence phenomenon that there are many values the continuum might take
that cannot be (currently) reasonably objected to (and so we are not in a p-
predicament). For (7.) we note that as a simple true or false question, we can easily
articulate the correct answer even if we do not know it (I just did), and again it is not
the case that both responses admit of strong seemingly defeating objections. Thus,
our ignorance regarding either CH or PD themselves is shallow, and in itself cannot
be used in coming to understand CH or PD better. A reformulation of the requisite
research question is required in order to bring agnotology to bear. Fortunately, the
17 There is a subtle question of how things go on multiversist pictures that are not as liberal as Hamkins’
(see, for example, Steel 2014 and Arrigoni and Friedman 2013). Though an expansion of the project
should accommodate these cases, for the sake of argumentative clarity we choose to focus on the
Universist position here.
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above two questions are not the only research questions involved in the project of
justifying new axioms for set theory. A famous quotation from Go¨del is helpful
here:
For if the meanings of the primitive terms of set theory...are accepted as
sound, it follows that the set-theoretical concepts and theorems describe some
well-determined reality, in which Cantor’s conjecture must be either true or
false. Hence its undecidability from the axioms being assumed today can only
mean that these axioms do not contain a complete description of that reality.
Such a belief is by no means chimerical, since it is possible to point out ways
in which the decision of a question, which is undecidable from the usual
axioms, might nevertheless be obtained. (Go¨del 1964, p. 260)
Important to Go¨del’s argument, and indeed subsequent discussions of the
justification of new axioms of set theory, is that we desire some way of achieving a
more complete description of the Universe. How can this be done? Discussing
certain axioms, Go¨del writes:
These axioms show clearly, not only that the axiomatic system of set theory as
used today is incomplete, but also that it can be supplemented without
arbitrariness by new axioms which only unfold the content of the concept of
set explained above. ( Go¨del 1964, pp. 260–261)
justifications then, for Go¨del, should respond to some feature of the universe of sets.
It is this feature of the Universe of sets, that explains18 why the continuum has the
value it does, or why every projective set of reals admits of a winning strategy. This
focus on explanation indeed is partly in the target of Bromberger (1992)’s analysis
of p-predicaments and b-predicaments. Thus we may phrase our question
(schematically) as follows:
(8:) Let / be some set-theoretic sentence independent from ZFC. What feature
(suitably axiomatised) of the universe of sets explains which of / and :/ is
true?
Now, we can be in either a p-predicament or b-predicament with respect to this
question. Let us consider each of CH and PD in turn. Of course, one’s ignorance of
(or indeed lack thereof) CH and PD is dependent upon the attitudes and epistemic
features of the agent in question. A salient problem here is that we can only examine
ignorance with respect to an individual set theorist, and finding consensus across the
community is difficult. We will, therefore, examine the different ways that
ignorance may play out, and what should be said in each case.
A very important difference between the two principles is that PD is at least
claimed to be known (or at least believed with a high degree of credence) by several
set theorists and philosophers. The fact that large cardinals imply determinacy
axioms, and that determinacy axioms imply the existence of inner models with large
18 It is, of course, an exceptionally tricky issue how to provide a full account of mathematical
explanation. We shall set this issue aside here.
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cardinals has been seen by several authors19 as good evidence for the truth of PD.
So, as an answer to (8.), many set theorists believe that:
(8.A) The network of results between determinacy axioms and Woodin
cardinals is good evidence for the truth of certain large cardinal axioms, and
the fact that the universe supports these cardinals explains why PD is true.
It is a difficult question whether or not such set theorists would claim to know the
truth value of PD. In what follows, to make our arguments clear, we will simply
assume this.20 The situation with CH is markedly different. Though there are
various projects aiming at finding a resolution of the continuum problem, few set
theorists would claim that they know the answer.
Suppose then that / is one of CH or PD, and that the agent does not believe that
she knows the answer to what explains whether or not /. Might we be in a p-
predicament with respect to the explanation of /?
The answer will depend on the extent to which one views the extant resolutions
of / as admitting defeating counter arguments. I think, however, it is fair to say that
each of the competing resolutions of CH or PD might be true. It would seem like a
highly pessimistic agent to say that each admits of defeating objections in her eyes.
Thus, while it is possible that we are in a p-predicament, it is possibly the less
interesting of the two phenomena.
We may very well be in a b-predicament with respect to (8.), however. It is
entirely plausible that the resolution to an independent sentence requires substantial
additional conceptual machinery, one that it might not be possible for us to
articulate given our current epistemic situation. Thus, especially with respect to CH,
the possibility of a b-predicament should both be acknowledged and examined.
Suppose on the other hand that the agent believes that she does know the answer
with respect to (8.) and either CH or PD holds (though, as noted above, it is more
likely that PD is the target here). In that case, she may be correct, and (8.) might
indeed be her preferred explanation for the truth of the relevant /. However, in this
situation, one can still envisage that the person might be wrong that they know the
sentence, say if the sentence holds but the universe does not conform to their desired
explanation. Here, the agent is in a variety of Gettier-style situation with respect to
PD (or CH). The relevant sentence is true but their justification is defective (in that
their explanation makes false claims about the universe). It is thus in their beliefs
about their justifications and explanations where the ignorance lies.21 In such a
situation, they would be opaquely ignorant. Moreover, they may well find
themselves in a b-predicament: the answer to the research question might be
19 See Koellner and Woodin (2010) for a survey of this literature.
20 We could have, instead, just moved to the nearest possible world at which the agent does believe that
she knows in order to examine the case there.
21 The example is interesting in its own right, as it creates problems for accounts of knowledge that make
use of possible worlds. For, many such accounts make use of a sensitivity constraint: in possible worlds in
which the sentence is false, the agent does not believe it. However, on the widely held view that
mathematical objects exist out of necessity if at all, it is difficult to make sense of this requirement. For,
on the assumption that that a mathematical sentence / is true (or false) there are no possible worlds in
which / is false (or true).
J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res.
123
beyond what the agent can conceive. Indeed, if we are generous to set theorists and
philosophers of set theory, we might think that should a truly correct and compelling
answer be discovered, it will ultimately be accepted.
Thus, we see that within the Universist’s framework there are several options.
For a given independent sentence /, and question of the form of (8.), we might be in
one of the following three situations: either (1) we know the answer to (8.), (2) our
ignorance is either conscious, or (3) we are opaquely ignorant in virtue of holding a
misplaced confidence in our erroneous reasons for holding / true. Assuming that we
are in fact ignorant (so in cases (1) or (2)), there is then the separate question of
whether or not we are in a b-predicament with respect to the independent sentence.
Moreover, in both the case of (2) and (3), there are reasons to think that a b-
predicament is at least possible, if not likely.
How Ignorance Affects Pluralism
Let us return to the case of PD. One might think that we should be, on a Universist’s
picture, in a less pernicious epistemic situation with PD compared to CH. We have
the Martin-Steel Theorem that PD follows from the existence of infinitely many
Woodin cardinals, and also know that axioms of definable determinacy reverse to
yield inner models of the large cardinals. We seem to have a wealth of information
in the case of PD that is not possessed in the CH case.
Note, however, that we are more likely to be opaquely ignorant with respect to PD,
given the Martin-Steel Theorem. If it turns out that there are not the requisite Woodin
cardinals (let’s say the existence of a Woodin cardinal turns out to be inconsistent), yet
we are currently staunch adherents to the view that PD holds in virtue of the existence
of infinitely many Woodin cardinals, then we would, as agents, be opaquely ignorant in
virtue of erroneously holding ourselves to be knowers. This goes for other programmes
or traditions too. It might simply turn out that the tradition in which the agent is steeped
is simply not correct concerning V, yielding opaque ignorance (assuming, of course,
that they have not rebelled against their tradition!). In fact, the mere existence of
incompatible foundational set-theoretic programmes, implies (assuming that there are
at least some who take themselves to know on each side) that there must be such
opaque ignorance for some agents. In contrast, assuming that we are consciously
ignorant of (8.) with respect to some sentence, we may very well hold that the correct
explanation is not something we can currently articulate.
The key fact to note is that in each case, determining whether or not one is in a b-
predicament is key, and if we are in a b-predicament investigation and resolution of
our b-predicament aids in the search for new axioms. In the case of PD, part of
shoring up our confidence in PD on the basis of infinitely many Woodin cardinals is
determining that there is not some hitherto unrecognised aspect of the Universe of
sets that vitiates our explanation. Similarly, one might think that with respect to why
CH or :CH holds, we are likely to be in a b-predicament. The only way this b-
predicament can be rectified is by developing and working within new foundational
proposals. The importance of determining our b-predicaments with respect to set
theory is thus important for engaging in the justificatory process. For, if we believe
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that we know why / holds, then analysing alternative pictures in detail helps to rule
them out and narrows the chance of there being a hitherto unrecognised aspect of
the universe of sets, and if we think that we do not know whether or not /, it is
entirely plausible that we are in a b-predicament and so should be open to new and
revolutionary set-theoretic axioms. This sort of process is one to which agnotol-
ogists are sensitive:
Here are some examples of such questions that have at some point played a
role in periods of massive theoretical and conceptual change: ‘‘What would we
observe if we chased alongside a light beam at the speed of light?’’, ‘‘Under
what conditions are two events that occur at different points in space
simultaneous?’’, ‘‘What happens when two freely falling heavy bodies are
connected in mid-fall?’’, ‘‘Why does the electron in an H atom not spiral into
the core, emitting radiation of greater and greater frequency?’’ These questions
were, I submit, understandable even before the respective episodes of
revolutionary change that they are associated with had occurred. It was in
taking them seriously and pursuing them (amongst other questions) that
Einstein, Galileo and Bohr encountered deep-seated problems which led them
to attempt radical theoretical-conceptual adjustments. These adjustments, in
turn, enabled them to pursue other, novel questions, thus opening up whole
new areas of conscious ignorance that had been thoroughly opaque before
(Wilholt 2017, pp. 16–17).
The point is that by analysing our b-predicaments and removing them, we can come
to fruitful conceptual change, converting much opaque ignorance into conscious
ignorance. Importantly however, this conversion is not just intrinsically interesting, but
also helps inform our confidence in our currently held beliefs. For example, suppose that
a new set theoretic principleW is proposed, one which both seems natural and to which
we were previously in a b-predicament. Suppose this principle also has the property
that it implies PD and reverses to inner models of large cardinals. This increases our
confidence in our explanation of the truth of PD; areas of opaque ignorance towards
which we were previously in a b-predicament turn out to mesh nicely with our overall
picture. Suppose on the other hand that there are some phenomena we wish to explain
and W seems both natural and implies these data. We come to hold the belief that W
explains the phenomena and we were previously in a b-predicament with respect to
this fact. However, suppose that it then turns out that W implies that there are no
Woodin cardinals. Our initial picture of the explanation and justification of PD would
be disconfirmed and might lead us to reform our epistemological and agnotological
stance towards PD and its explanation.
What is the pluralistic upshot? Simply that much of philosophical discourse
concerning set theory has been in promotion of one or other conception of the nature
of the set-theoretic universe, to the possible detriment of other projects and
foundational theory. Our analysis questions the extent to which this is a fruitful22
22 The concept of fruitfulness has been the focus of a good deal of recent work in the philosophy of
mathematics recently (such as in Tappenden 2008 and Maddy 2011). We do not mean anything too deep
(or precise) by the term: simply that this methodology might not be the best or most effective.
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methodology. Certainly views have to be defended against objections, and often
doing so is the best way of filling them out in full detail. If, however, this is pursued
solely for the promotion of one set of axioms over others we run into two
difficulties. First, as discussed above, even if one has a favourite position concerning
the nature of the universe of sets, the study of alternative frameworks helps to
reassure oneself that one is not in an erroneous opaque b-predicament with respect
to the view. Secondly, the resolution of b-predicaments in a manner compatible with
one’s position results in truly novel observations concerning V, thereby helping one
to better situate one’s position. However, in coming to a resolution of a b-
predicament, even one that ends up being resolved in a manner compatible with
one’s own view, we may require a period of toleration of other foundational systems
in tension with one’s current position. After all, it is precisely the nature of b-
predicaments that we cannot yet formulate the relevant solution. Exploration of
these issues thus requires novel techniques, some of which may conflict with our
own view while being necessary to see the shape of a solution. Thus, somewhat
paradoxically, one’s own view can be strengthened (both through understanding our
knowledge/ignorance and our level of confidence in our justifications/explanations)
by adopting a Pluralism towards foundational theory in order to draw out the
contents of different ways of looking at the universe. The development of
alternative frameworks yields information about one’s own preferred theory (indeed
many other theories) and helps us to tell a better story of how different axiom
systems stand with respect to confirmation. Fixation on a single theory masks this
useful information and obscures possible unorthodox pioneering insights.
Conclusion
Let us take stock. We identified in ‘‘Varieties of Independence’’ two main kinds of
independence from ZFC; those for which we believe we have a well-justified
response (using large cardinals) and those which we find more perplexing. We then
argued in ‘‘Multiversism and Pluralism’’ that often Multiversism and Pluralism are
linked. In ‘‘Varieties of Ignorance’’ we reviewed some of the agnotological
literature and noted the difference between conscious ignorance, opaque ignorance,
articulated through the notions of p-predicaments and b-predicaments. In ‘‘What is
Our Ignorance of Independent Sentences Like?’’ we provided an analysis of how we
might be ignorant of explanations of the truth or falsity of sentences independent
from ZFC. We argued that our ignorance may be either opaque or conscious,
shallow or deep depending on the agent. It was also argued, however, that b-
predicaments could have a special role to play in our understanding of
independence; through examining our b-predicaments we both shore up held
beliefs and attack our conscious ignorance effectively. This focus on the possibility
of b-predicaments motivates a pluralism about foundational theory,23 even on a
23 There is a very deep question here, one we do not have the space to address, of how agnotology might
inform Pluralism concerning the language in which we express our foundational theory. We might
consider, for example, whether agnotology has any implications for the ‘debate’ between set-theoretic,
category-theoretic, and homotopy-type-theoretic foundations.
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Universist understanding of the subject matter of set theory. While the Universist
may think that one theory is true, the adoption of different foundational theories is
an effective way of yielding epistemological information about each.
We close with a remark concerning directions for future research. While it has
been argued that the Universist has some reason to accept Pluralism, it remains to be
seen how independence relates to the study of ignorance on other ontological
frameworks (e.g. the various species of Multiversism). Moreover, we selected the
two very narrow cases of PD and CH, a full examination of our ignorance of other
kinds of independence (such as the independence of large cardinals) may also be in
order. For the moment, however, it seems that the philosophical study of ignorance
has interesting insights for the search for new axioms in set theory.
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